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This paper studies the coordination issue of a supply chain consisting of one retailer and two suppliers, amain supplier and a backup
supplier. The main supplier’s yield is subject to disruption and the retailer faces a random demand. We determine the retailer’s
optimal ordering policy and the main supplier’s production quantity that maximize expected profit of the centralized supply chain.
We also analyze the decentralized scenario, and a combination of overproduction risk sharing and buy-back contracts with a side
payment from/to the backup supplier is provided to coordinate the supply chain. Numerical examples are given to gain some
qualitative insights.
1. Introduction
This paper studies the coordination issue of a supply chain
among one retailer and two suppliers under random demand
and supply disruption. Different from the previous research
that focuses on the supplier’s random yield, we consider the
supply disruption, during which the output of the production
is zero. We also propose an overproduction risk sharing
(OPRS) and buy-back contracts with a side payment for
supply chain coordination. Since our work touches upon
two areas of research: random yield with disruption and
contracts in a supply chain with demand uncertainty, we
confine ourselves to reviewing the following related works of
these two topics.
In general, any production or logistics process is some-
what related to random yield; that is, with equal amount
input, the output of the production usually varies. Due to
damage that occurs during transferring, any transportation
process can also be viewed as random yield process [1]; for
example, in the liquid crystal displaymanufacturing industry,
it is quite common to get a production yield of less than 50%.
Then the actual response of the supplier to the retailer’s order
will be mandated by the supply contract between them; for
example, if the cost of tracking partial orders is high or the
transportation costs are high, the supply contract may specify
delivery in a single shipment with the uncertainty in delivery
time [2]; in other situations, the manufacturer may agree to
accept partial shipment of the order quantity [3].
Gerchak and Grosfeld-Nir [4] analyzed the tradeoff
between setup cost and production cost when making
batch production decisions, where both the random yield
and random demand follow a general discrete distribution.
Granot and Yin [5] investigated the effect of sequential
commitment in the decentralized newsvendor model with
price-dependent demand, where the supplier and the retailer
sequentially commit on prices and quantities. Mukhopad-
hyay andMa [6] developed a single-period model to evaluate
the optimal procurement and production decisions with
uncertain demand and random yield of the used parts under
three different cases. Wang [7] investigated the traditional
and vendor-managed inventory arrangements in a supply
chain and obtained the optimal production/inventory deci-
sions under random yield and uncertain demand for both
arrangements. He and Zhang [8] studied a seller/supplier
commitment contract with minimum delivery commitment
and analyzed the supply chain with the risk sharing contract
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under a constant secondary market price- and a yield-
dependent secondary market price. He and Zhao [9] inves-
tigated the ordering policy of the retailer, raw material
planning decision of the supplier, and the optimal contracts
for a three-level supply chain with random yield and demand.
Gurnani et al. [10] considered an assembly problem, where
a firm faces random demand for a final product and a
general yield distribution of two critical components from
the individual suppliers. Using the modified cost function,
they determined the combined component ordering quantity
and assembly decisions for the firm. In the model of Gu¨ler
and Bilgic¸ [11], they studied the coordination of an assem-
bly system for arbitrary number of suppliers with random
demand and random yield and established the concavity
of expected supply chain profit and proposed two mixed
type of contracts to coordinate the chain under forced
compliance. Under the wholesale price contract, Keren [12]
analyzed a two-tier supply chain, where a distributor facing a
deterministic demand procures a product from a producer
confronting a random production yield. And an analytical
solution to the distributor’s ordering decision is derivedwhen
the production yield follows the uniformdistribution. Li et al.
[13] extended and provided new results on the supply chain
model with producer’s random yield proposed by Keren [12].
They derived analytic solutions of the supply chain decisions
under generalized yield distribution and pointed out that the
distributor should order more than the demand if and only
if his/her marginal profit from selling this product exceeds a
threshold.
Supply disruption is not considered by the above-cited
literature on random yield. However, in a practical reality, a
supplier may be unable to satisfy the production order for
a variety of reasons, such as equipment failures, damaged
facilities, problems in procuring the necessary raw materials,
and so forth. With more and more enterprises starting to
realize that supply disruption severely affects their ability
to successfully manage their own supply chains, supply
disruption management has received increasing attention.
Many researchers have devoted much effort to studying this
issue. Based on the sample firms, Hendricks and Singhal [14]
estimated the short-term effects of supply disruption such as
production or shipment delays on shareholder value. They
found that glitch announcements decrease shareholder value
by 10.82%. Furthermore, Hendricks and Singhal [14] investi-
gated the long-term negative effects of supply disruption on
the financial performance of firms based. They found that
the average abnormal stock returns of firms that experienced
disruptions is nearly 40% and the firms cannot quickly
recover from the negative effects of a disruption. Taking into
account the disruption frequency and the loss of market
share, Pochard [15] analyzed the value and the benefits of dual
sourcing. Oke andGopalakrishnan [16] investigated the types
and management of risks in a retail supply chain. Yu et al.
[17] studied the sourcing decision alternatives between single
sourcing anddual sourcing in a two-stage supply chain,where
the demand is price-sensitive and the market scale increases
when a supply disruption occurs. Sarkar and Mohapatra [18]
considered the risks of supply disruption due to occurrence
of super, semisuper, and unique events and determined the
optimal size of supply base. Tomlin [19] studied a single-
product model in which a firm can source from a cheap
but unreliable supplier and/or an expensive but reliable
supplier. They established supplier characteristics and firm
characteristics in determining the firm’s optimal strategy for
managing supply disruption risk. Meena et al. [20] developed
an analytical model to determine the optimal number of
suppliers under different failure probability, capacity, and
compensation. Li et al. [21] investigated the sourcing strategy
of a retailer and the pricing strategies of two suppliers in a
supply chainwith supply disruption. Formore existing supply
disruption models, we refer to the review in Snyder and Shen
[22].
Since double marginalization [23] will directly lead to
inefficient performance of the supply chain, coordination
of activities among the different members in the supply
chain is necessary for the whole supply chain’s effective
management. A great deal of effort has been devoted to
researching the supply chain coordination issues. All kinds
of popular contracts have been explored in the literature for
the supply chain coordination, such as buy-back contracts or
returns policies [24–26], revenue sharing contracts [27, 28],
wholesale price contracts [27, 29], risk sharing contracts [30],
quantity discount policies [31], quantity flexibility contracts
[32], sales rebate contracts [33], and so on. Recently, Ding
and Chen [34] studied how to fully coordinate a three-level
supply chain with a flexible return policies by setting the rules
of pricing while postponing the determination of the final
contract prices. He et al. [35] studied supply chain contracts
and coordination when the downstream retailer faces both
effort- and price-dependent stochastic demand. In such a
situation, since all traditional contracts fail to coordinate the
retailer’s action and distort the retailer’s marginal incentive
to exert system optimal effort and price, none of them can
coordinate the supply chain. Hence they explored a variety
of other combined contracts and found that only a properly
designed returns policy with a sales rebate and a penalty
contract is able to achieve channel coordination and lead
to a Pareto improving win-win situation for supply chain
members. Xiao et al. [36] studied coordination of a two-
echelon supply chain with consumer return and random
demand, where consumers also face uncertainty in their
valuations for products. Granot and Yin [5] investigated
the effect of sequential commitment in the decentralized
newsvendor model with price-dependent demand, where the
supplier and the retailer sequentially commit on prices and
quantities. van der Rhee et al. [37] propose a new spanning
revenue sharing contract mechanism that the most down-
stream entity initiates a single contract involving all upstream
entities for multiechelon supply chains, and analyzed the
new revenue sharing contract in the linear supply chain
setting with stochastic demand. Lin et al. [38] proposed an
insurance contract under which the supplier shares the risk of
overstock and understock with the retailer, and showed that
the insurance contract can coordinate the supply chain with a
newsvendor-type product. Li et al. [39] explored a generalized
supply chain model and showed the double marginalization
effect in the supply chain under supply uncertainty. When
the demand is deterministic, a wholesale price contract and
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a shortage penalty contract is developed to coordinate the
supply chain. When the demand is random, two equivalent
coordination contracts (called accept-all type contracts for
the buyer) are proposed to induce the supplier into the
systematically optimal production input level.
The works by He and Zhang [40] and Hou et al. [41] are
similar to our study here. He and Zhang [40] studied the
effects of random yield in a decentralized supply chain and
proposed several risk sharing contracts. They also compared
the results of proposed contracts and found that randomyield
might enhance the supply chain performance and decrease
the double marginalization effect under certain conditions.
But there is no alternative sources available and the yield
disruption is not considered in their paper. Hou et al. [41]
investigated a buy-back contract between a buyer and a
backup supplier when the buyer’s main supplier is subject to
disruption. They derived the buyer’s optimal order quantity
and the backup supplier’s optimal return price under the
recurrent supply uncertainty and the demand uncertainty,
respectively. But in their study, the coordination mechanism
between the main supplier is not concerned, and they do not
investigate the buyer’s optimal decision when both recurrent
supply uncertainty and the demand uncertainty exist.
The majority of the literature considers that the yield is
a stochastic proportion of the planned quantity and does
not consider the coordination and the yield disruption in
the chain, and most of the existing literature that studies
the coordination mechanism is confined to the supply chain
consisting of one retailer and one supplier. In this paper, we
integrate the works of He and Zhang [40] and Hou et al.
[41] and study the retailer’s optimal ordering policy and the
main supplier’s optimal planned production quantity under
random demand and random supply with disruption. We
investigate the coordination between one retailer and two
suppliers—one is a main source and the other is a backup,
and show that two contracts with three components: overpro-
duction risk sharing, buy-back, and a payment from/to the
backup supplier cannot only coordinate our supply chain but
also divide thewhole chain’s expected profit at any proportion
among the three members.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we provide a description of the model. In Section 3, we
study optimal solution for the integrated supply chain. In
Section 4, both the retailer’s decision and the main supplier’s
decision are given in the decentralized scenario. In Section 5,
we argue that simple wholesale and overproduction risk
sharing contract cannot coordinate the chain. A combination
of overproduction risk sharing and buy-back contracts with a
side payment from the backup supplier to the main supplier
is provided to coordinate the chain. Numerical examples to
illustrate further insights are provided in Section 5. Finally,
some conclusions and further research topics are given in
Section 6.
2. Model Description
We consider a single-period supply chain consisting of
one retailer and two supplier with the assumption that
the information is symmetrical, where one supplier (called
main supplier) is unreliable with cheaper wholesale price,
and the other supplier (called backup supplier) is perfectly
reliable with more expensive wholesale price. This sup-
ply phenomenon is often seen in the off-shoring situation
[42].
We use 𝐿 to denote the main supplier’s decision on how
many products to produce, and assume that the yields of the
supplier will be 𝑌𝐿, where 𝑌 is a random yield variable and
positive support on [0, 1] which satisfies 𝑃{𝑌 = 0} = 𝑝 and
𝑃{0 < 𝑌 ⩽ 1} = ∫
1
0
𝑔(𝑦)𝑑𝑦 = 1 − 𝑝 = 𝑞, where 𝑔(𝑦)
is a nonnegative function (note that the yield is subject to
disruption with a probability 𝑝, and 𝑔(𝑦) is not a probability
density function unless 𝑝 = 0, i.e., there is no disruption).We
assume that the backup supplier’s production has a perfect
yield, for example, the backup supplier can convert similar
or better products from his inventory to satisfy the order. We
also assume that the retailer faces a random demand,𝑋, with
cumulative distribution function, 𝐹(𝑥), probability density
function, 𝑓(𝑥), and 𝐸(𝑋) = 𝜇
𝑋
.
The main supplier’s per unit production cost is 𝑐
𝑚
, and
a marginal cost 𝛼𝑐
𝑚
is incurred in the event of a disruption
[21]. The unit understock cost to the retailer is 𝑐
𝑢
(this
cost may include loss of reputation). In order to mitigate
supply risks, the retailer orders 𝑄 units from the backup
supplier at the beginning of the selling seasons. The main
supplier’s whole price is 𝑤
𝑚
per delivery unit, and the
backup supplier charges the retailer a wholesale price 𝑤
𝑏
per delivery unit. The main supplier’s production cost of
each planned unit is 𝑐
𝑚
, and the unit production cost of the
backup supplier is 𝑐
𝑏
. The retailer sells the products to the
end customer at the unit price 𝑠. At the end of the selling
season, all unsold products will be salvaged at a value of 𝑣 per
unit.
Based on the reliability of the backup supplier, it is




> 𝑣. In addition, we assume








. These inequalities make
sure that each member has a positive profit.
3. Centralized Model
To establish a performance benchmark, we first analyze
the optimal solution of an integrated supply chain. In the




(𝑄, 𝐿) = 𝑠𝐸min (𝑋, 𝑌𝐿 + 𝑄) + 𝑣𝐸(𝑌𝐿 + 𝑄 − 𝑋)+
− 𝑐
𝑢








where 𝛿 = 𝛼𝑝+𝑞.The first term in (1) is the expected revenue
from sales, the second term is the salvaged value, the third
term is the opportunity costs due to the lost sales, and the last
two terms are the production costs.
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From (1), the integrated supply chain’s expected profit
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(𝑥 − 𝑦𝐿 − 𝑄)] 𝑓 (𝑥) 𝑑𝑥}






The following Proposition 1 states that the objective function
in (2) is concave. Hence, the optimal production quantity and
order quantity from the backup supplier can be determined




(𝑄, 𝐿) is jointly concave in 𝑄 and 𝐿.
FromProposition 1, we can characterize the optimal order
quantity, 𝑄𝑐, and the optimal planned production quantity,
𝐿
𝑐, through the first-order conditions. In particular, we have
the following Proposition 2.
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From Proposition 2, we can obtain the maximum
































4. Decentralized Model under
a Traditional Arrangement
Now we consider the decentralized scenario under the tradi-
tional arrangement; that is, the two suppliers and the retailer
are independent agents and derive their individual expected
profit, respectively. At the beginning of the selling season, the
retailer places an order quantity 𝑅 from the main supplier,
and orders 𝑄 units of products from the backup supplier in
order to mitigate supply risks. It is worth mentioning that the
retailer does not charge the main supplier any penalty for the
unsatisfied orders caused by the supply risks, but when its
delivery quantity is higher than 𝑅, the retailer accepts only
the amount equal to 𝑅.
4.1. Main Supplier’s Production decision. For given order





𝐸min (𝑌𝐿, 𝑅) + 𝑣𝐸(𝑌𝐿 − 𝑅)+ − 𝛿𝑐
𝑚
𝐿. (6)
Here, the first term is the supplier’s revenue from the retailer’s
order, the second term is the salvaged value, and the last term
is the production costs.
Proposition 3. For given 𝑅, the main supplier’s optimal
planned production quantity 𝐿∗(𝑅) = 𝜁𝑅, where 𝜁 is indepen-








































) < 0. (9)
It follows from (9) that Π
𝑚
is concave. Hence, setting
𝑑Π
𝑚
/𝑑𝐿 = 0, we can derive (7).
4.2. The Retailer’s Ordering Policy. Taking into account the
response from themain supplier, the retailer’s expected profit,
Π
𝑟
(𝑄, 𝑅), is given by
Π
𝑟
(𝑄, 𝑅) = 𝑠𝐸min (𝑋, 𝑅+𝑄, 𝑌𝜁𝑅+𝑄)+𝑣𝐸(𝑌𝜁𝑅 + 𝑄−𝑋)+
− 𝑐
𝑢
𝐸[𝑋 − 𝑅min (1, 𝜁𝑌) − 𝑄]+
− 𝑤
𝑚




The first term in (10) is the expected revenue from the sales,
the second term is the earnings from salvaging the unsold
products, the third term is the understock cost, and the last
two terms are the cost of buying products from the two
suppliers.
From (10), using the same argument as Proposition 1, we
can obtain that Π
𝑟
(𝑄, 𝑅) is jointly concave in 𝑄 and 𝑅, and
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the unique (𝑄𝑑, 𝑅𝑑) that maximizes Π
𝑟
(𝑄, 𝑅) can be derived
as follows.
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𝑢
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Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 2.
Given the retailer’s optimal order quantity𝑄𝑑 and 𝑅𝑑, the






























and the backup supplier’s expected profit and the main




















total expected profit of the decentralized supply chain, then














Proposition 5 indicates that the decentralized supply
chain’s expected profit will be lower than that of an integrated
supply chain. This phenomenon is well known as double
marginalization [23]. It also shows the importance of supply







, we have 𝜁 → 1 and 𝐿𝑑(𝑅) →




, then we have 𝐿𝑑 = 𝐿𝑐 and 𝑄𝑑 =
𝑄
𝑐 by the retailer’s first-order conditions (11). In other words,
the total expected profit of the decentralized supply chain is
closer to the integrated system as the two supplier’s wholesale
price approaches their production cost, respectively.
5. Supply Chain Coordination
5.1. Overproduction Risk Sharing Contract. Risk sharing is
one of the most common method of achieving supply chain
coordination.This method aligns the objectives of the supply
chain members and coordinates their activities to optimize
system performance. The OPRS contract ensures the main
supplier’s risk of producing too many units (compared to the
quantity ordered) being shared by the retailer [40]. Under
the OPRS contract, the retailer commits to pay for all units
produced by themain supplier. But he only pays thewholesale
price 𝑤
𝑚
per unit for the order quantity 𝑅, and quantities
that exceed this amount are compensated at a discount price
𝑤
𝑑
per unit. In order to guarantee that the main supplier is
willing to sell the surplus products to the retailer and prevent
the main supplier from producing an unlimited amount, we




















Proposition 6. For given 𝑅, the main supplier’s optimal





















Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 3.
Given the main supplier’s best response function 𝐿𝑑(𝑅) =
𝜁
𝑐
𝑅, the retailer’s expected profit can be written as follows:
Π
𝑟
(𝑄, 𝑅) = 𝑠𝐸min (𝑋, 𝑌𝐿 + 𝑄) + 𝑣𝐸(𝑌𝐿 + 𝑄 − 𝑋)+
− 𝑐
𝑢

















Proposition 7. The OPRS contract cannot coordinate the
supply chain.
Although the OPRS contract can reduce the main sup-
plier’s overproduction risk, it increases the retailer’s overstock
risk.Hence, the retailerwill not choose the order quantity that
is the same as the integrated supply chain. But if the suppliers
are willing to pay the retailer back for unsold products, then
the supply chain coordination may be achieved. In the next
subsection, we will construct a combined contract with a side
payment to coordinate the supply chain.
5.2. Overproduction Risk Sharing with Buy-Back and a Pay-
ment from/to the Backup Supplier. This contract is a mixture
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of overproduction risk sharing and buy-back contracts. For
simplification, it is assumed that the main supplier deliver







whether his actual output of the product is more than the
retailer’s order quantity or not, and he will buy all of the
retailer’s unsold products back with a return price𝑤
𝑟
per unit
at the end of the selling season; for example, themain supplier
can disassemble the unsold products and remanufacture at
a lower production cost. We assume that 𝑤
𝑟







to avoid the triviality of the main supplier producing
an infinite amount (this inequality implies that the main
supplier’s compensation for a unsold product is more than
the profit that he earns for the sale of it). Note that the main
supplier may return the unsold quantities that exceed his
output, for example, the unsold products will be𝑌𝐿+𝑄−𝑋 >
𝑌𝐿 if 𝑋 < 𝑄 (in this case, the main supplier also returns
some of the backup supplier’s products). Hence, in order to
compensate for the main supplier’s product recycling risk,
the backup supplier pays a side payment 𝑇(>0) to him. If
𝑇 < 0, it can be interpreted that the main supplier gives
some reimbursement to the backup supplier for coordination,
since he produce more products and earns more profit when
the supply chain is coordinated. Hence the parameter 𝑇
is adopted to split the expected profit of the coordinated
system between two suppliers, and the parameter 𝑇 can be
interpreted as that the two suppliers share their expected
profits.
Under the above combined contract, the expected profit
















𝐸 (𝑌𝐿) − (𝑤
𝑟












) 𝑄 − 𝑇, (18)
respectively.









𝑣)), then the main supplier’s optimal planned production
























−𝑣)), then 𝐿𝑑(𝑄) = 0.
Proof. Taking the first and second derivatives of (15) with



























𝑓 (𝑦𝐿 + 𝑄) 𝑦
2
𝑔 (𝑦) 𝑑𝑦 < 0. (21)
It follows from (20) thatΠ
𝑚





































< 0, and hence there exists a unique 𝐿𝑑(𝑅)













/𝑑𝐿 ⩽ 0 for 𝐿 > 0 and




= 𝑠 + 𝑐
𝑢



























𝑥𝑓 (𝑥) 𝑔 (𝑦) 𝑑𝑥 𝑑𝑦] ,
(22)




























then we have the following proposition.











































] and 𝑇 ∈ [𝑇min, 𝑇max], then the supply chain can
be coordinated.
Proposition 10. Under the combined contract and contract
parameters in (25), an arbitrary allocation of the optimal




Proposition 9 shows that the expected profit of the
integrated supply chain can be shared with any specified
ratios among three members. A simply effective but not
exclusive way to set the profit allocated ratios is to let them
equal to the profit ratios between the correspondingmembers
before introducing the contracts, which can certainly ensure
that each entity earns more as the contracts increase the total
profit of the channel.
6. Numerical Examples
In this section, we provide some numerical examples to gain
further insights.We assume that the retailer’s demand follows


















































Figure 2: Effect of disruption probability on optimal profits.
a normal distribution with mean 𝜇
𝑋
= 1000 and standard
deviation 𝜎
𝑋
= 200. We also specify that 𝑔(𝑦) = 𝑞/(𝑏 − 𝑎),
where 0 ⩽ 𝑎 < 𝑏 ⩽ 1. Hence, the main supplier’s yield
has a mean of 𝜇
𝑌
= (𝑎 + 𝑏)𝑞/2 and a standard deviation of
𝜎
𝑌
= √[(4 − 3𝑞)(𝑎 + 𝑏)
2
− 4𝑎𝑏]𝑞/(2√3). The base values of











= 18, 𝛼 = 0.25, 𝑎 = 0.4,





6.1. Effect of theDisruption Probability. Under different values
of 𝑝, we plot the optimal solutions in Figure 1 and plot the
corresponding optimal profits in Figure 2, for the centralized
and decentralized systems, respectively.
Figure 1 shows that the order quantity from the backup
supplier increases and the planned production quantity of
the main supplier decreases as 𝑝 increases. Since larger
disruption probability results in greater supply risk of
the main supplier, the retailer will order more products
from the backup supplier who has no production risk
for avoiding risk increases, and the main supplier will
decrease his production in order to reduce the production
risk.
Figure 2 shows that an increase in the disruption prob-
ability 𝑝 decreases the profits of both the retailer and the
main supplier. But this is not the case for the backup supplier.
Since the retailer’s order quantity from the backup supplier
increases with the disruption probability. For all values of
𝑝, the integrated supply chain’s profit is significantly lager
than the total expected profit of the three members in the
decentralized supply chain.
6.2. Effect of the Random Uncertainty and Demand Uncer-
tainty. Tables 1 and 2 present the profits of the supply
chain with and without coordination under different yield














, 1) in the centralized model. Table 1 shows that the
profits of three members decrease as the yield uncertainty
increases, which gives the main supplier an incentive to
decrease the planned production quantity for reducing yield
uncertainty. Since the retailer also greatly benefits from the
decrease in the yield uncertainty, he has an incentive to help
the supplier to reduce the uncertainty through increasing the
return price, and to place a larger order from the backup
supplier for transferring the main supplier’s supply risk.
Table 2 indicates that lower demand uncertainty benefits the
retailer and the backup supplier, but this is not the case for the
main suppliers. Since the retailer will order smaller quantities
as the demand variability decreases, it will directly reduce the
main supplier’s profit. We can also from Table 2 find that 𝜁∗
is invariant. This is true for the reason that 𝜁∗ is independent
of the demand.
From Tables 1 and 2, we find that the retailer’s expected
profit significantly decreases and as the suppliers’ whole price
increase without coordination. Supply chain coordination
greatly benefits the retailer and the whole supply chain, and
this becomes more obvious when the demand uncertainty is
more severe. We also see that the coordinated supply chain





In this paper, we consider a supply chain including one
retailer and two suppliers under random demand and ran-
dom yield, where the yield is subject to disruption with
a determinate probability. Both the centralized scenario
and decentralized scenario are studied, and the retailer’s
optimal ordering policy and the main supplier’s optimal
planned production quantity are provided. In the decen-
tralized setting, we propose a combined contract that
is a combination of OPRS and buy-back contracts with
an additional side payment to component regarding the
worse performing supplier. With the combined contract,
the appropriate whole price and return price can coordi-
nate the supply and allocate the integrate supply chain’s
profit with any specified ratios between the retailer and
the two suppliers, and the side payment can further split
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Table 1: Impact of different yield variabilities on the supply chain.
Models Contract parameters (a, b) 𝑄∗ 𝐿𝑑 𝜁∗ Π𝑟 Π𝑚 Π𝑏 Total







(0.50, 0.90) 17.59 114.78 1.61 92.11 556.49 161.48 810.08
(0.45, 0.95) 19.62 114.46 1.63 91.13 531.74 180.11 802.98
(0.40, 1.00) 22.33 112.25 1.65 89.71 501.86 205.02 796.59
(18.40, 20.52)
(0.50, 0.90) 16.49 112.83 1.61 63.84 563.02 156.96 783.82
(0.45, 0.95) 18.51 112.46 1.63 62.90 537.68 176.29 776.87
(0.40, 1.00) 21.22 110.21 1.65 61.56 507.10 202.06 770.71
(18.84, 20.86)
(0.50, 0.90) 15.34 110.91 1.61 36.33 569.10 151.27 756.70
(0.45, 0.95) 17.36 110.49 1.63 35.45 543.19 171.26 749.89
(0.40, 1.00) 20.07 108.20 1.65 34.17 511.90 197.91 743.99








(17.9, 20.18, 16.5, 240)
(0.50, 0.90) 45.64 158.91 1.00 359.20 596.39 178.95 1134.54
(0.45, 0.95) 49.85 152.91 1.00 355.88 553.78 217.65 1127.32
(0.40, 1.00) 54.29 146.27 1.00 352.12 508.64 258.39 1119.15
(18.40, 20.52, 17.0, 250)
(0.50, 0.90) 45.64 158.91 1.00 330.48 619.59 184.46 1134.54
(0.45, 0.95) 49.85 152.91 1.00 327.31 575.41 224.60 1127.32
(0.40, 1.00) 54.29 146.27 1.00 323.71 528.59 266.85 1119.15
(18.84, 20.86, 17.5, 260)
(0.50, 0.90) 45.64 158.91 1.00 301.77 642.79 189.98 1134.54
(0.45, 0.95) 49.85 152.91 1.00 298.73 597.03 231.55 1127.32
(0.40, 1.00) 54.29 146.27 1.00 295.31 548.54 275.31 1119.15
Table 2: Impact of different demand variabilities on the supply chain.




















(100, 40) 37.63 87.41 1.65 135.49 402.17 358.24 895.90
(100, 45) 29.52 98.70 1.65 97.72 454.14 281.05 832.91
(100, 50) 21.22 110.21 1.65 61.56 507.10 202.06 770.71
(18.84, 20.86)
(100, 40) 36.73 85.76 1.65 106.70 405.76 362.17 874.62
(100, 45) 28.50 96.86 1.65 69.62 458.29 281.03 808.94
(100, 50) 20.07 108.20 1.65 34.17 511.90 197.91 743.99
(19.28, 21.20)
(100, 40) 35.79 84.13 1.65 78.53 408.99 365.10 852.61
(100, 45) 27.43 95.04 1.65 42.22 462.05 279.84 784.10
(100, 50) 18.87 106.20 1.65 7.56 516.30 192.46 716.32








(18.40, 20.52, 17.0, 240)
(100, 40) 63.64 117.35 1.00 348.63 459.98 365.85 1174.45
(100, 45) 58.99 131.86 1.00 336.06 488.69 321.63 1146.38
(100, 50) 54.29 146.27 1.00 323.71 518.59 276.85 1119.15
(18.84, 20.86, 17.5, 250)
(100, 40) 63.64 117.35 1.00 319.13 477.84 377.48 1174.45
(100, 45) 58.99 131.86 1.00 307.12 507.57 331.69 1146.38
(100, 50) 54.29 146.27 1.00 295.31 538.54 285.31 1119.15
(19.28, 21.20, 18, 260)
(100, 40) 63.64 117.35 1.00 289.64 495.69 389.12 1174.45
(100, 45) 58.99 131.86 1.00 278.18 526.45 341.75 1146.38
(100, 50) 54.29 146.27 1.00 266.90 558.48 293.77 1119.15
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the profit between the main supplier and the backup
supplier. Numerical examples show that coordination can
greatly benefit the retailer and the whole supply chain,
and that the coordinated supply chain can achieve Pareto
improvement by choosing the appropriate contract parame-
ters.
One direct extension of this work is to study the proposed
model under risk measures such as expected utility objec-
tive, mean-variance criterion, and conditional value-at-risk.
Another extension is to consider our problems with asym-
metric information on various factors such as the random
yield and the random demand. We leave these problems for
further research.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. From (1), the first-order and second-
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(A.6)
where the the first inequality follows from the Cauchy-
Schwarz inequality. Therefore, the Hessian matrix of Π(𝑄, 𝐿)
is a negative definite matrix, which implies that Π
𝑐
(𝑄, 𝐿) is
jointly concave in (𝑄, 𝐿).
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) From (A.4), it is obvious that
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there exists a unique optimal 𝐿𝑐(𝑄) that satisfies the first-
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]. Furthermore, it follows from (A.2) that 𝐿𝑐(𝑄) = 0
for all 𝑄 > 𝑄
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. When 𝐿𝑐(𝑄) = 0, we can obtain that Π
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Proof of Proposition 5. FromProposition 3, the total expected
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(A.14)
then
𝑑𝐾 (𝑅 | 𝑄)
𝑑𝑅
= (𝑠 − 𝑣 + 𝑐
𝑢
) [1 − 𝐹 (𝑄 + 𝑅)] > 0, (A.15)
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Proof of Proposition 7. Take the first derivatives with𝑄 and 𝑅
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By comparing (A.17) with (A.1)-(A.2), we find that 𝑄𝑑 = 𝑄𝑐













, then the backup supplier’s expected profit is




will result in the main supplier
producing an infinite amount. Hence, the OPRS contract
cannot coordinate the supply chain.
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If conditions in (21)-(22) are fulfilled, then by comparing
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If the supply chain coordination is achieved, then the
expected profits for the retailer, the main supplier, and the
backup supplier are Π𝑐
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